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INTRODUCTION

On July 7, 1784, a young man named Richard Corbett stood in
London's main criminal court, the Old Bailey He was not there as a
spectator or witness. He was the accused, indicted for arson. The evidence was presented, then the judge summarized the case for the jury.
At the end of the summary, the judge gave the jury this instruction:
"[I]f there is a reasonable doubt, in that case that doubt ought to decide in favor of the prisoner."'
To modem Americans, the instruction will be familiar. We take pride
inthe presumption of innocence and in the rule that the defendant must
be acquitted if the prosecution does not establish the facts of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the concept of reasonable doubt
and the judge's instruction to the jury of the prosecution's burden to
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satisfy the reasonable doubt standard are hallmarks of our criminal
law. Yet what is the history of this reasonable doubt instruction?
Professor James Q. Whitman, an expert in legal history and comparative law, offers an answer in this new book, which brings together
the history of the Anglo-American trial by jury and of Continental inquisitorial criminal procedure to shed light on the mystery of the reasonable doubt standard. The book is wide ranging in time and scope, and
it is deeply learned. The argument is well articulated and intriguing. The
book, in sum, makes an important contribution to our understanding.
This Review proceeds in three main parts. Part I outlines the
book's argument. Part II highlights four significant aspects of the book
meriting high accolades. Part III raises four questions prompted by the
book's thesis.
I. THE BOOK'S ARGUMENT

The book begins with a mystery. The concept of reasonable doubt
is "fundamental and universally familiar ... but in practice it is vexingly

difficult to interpret and apply" (p 1). So what exactly does reasonable
doubt mean? In the Anglo-American legal tradition, phrases are traditionally given content through the accumulation of precedent; yet this
has been impossible for reasonable doubt, because judges at common
law were "forbidden to explain the meaning of the phrase" (p 2). This
prohibition remains in force in some American jurisdictions, such as
Illinois, where the state supreme court declared in 1992 that "neither
the court nor counsel should attempt to define the reasonable doubt
standard."4 The result is that modern jurors are "understandably baffled" (p 1) when trying to apply the standard to the facts at hand.
Resolving the mystery requires a proper understanding of history.
Reasonable doubt is "the last vestige of a vanished premodern Christian world" (p 2). Reasonable doubt was originally a protection not for
criminal defendants, but rather for the "souls of the jurors" (p 3). Reasonable doubt was "designed to make conviction easier" by reassuring
anxious jurors that they would not be damned for voting to spill the
defendant's blood (p 4 (emphasis omitted)). Jurors could safely convict
as long as their hesitations did not rise to the level of reasonable doubt.
Chapter 1 ("Of Factual Proof and Moral Comfort") emphasizes
the dangers of rendering judgment in a premodern Western European
3 See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363 (1970) (emphasizing that the "reasonable-doubt
standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure"); Wayne R. LaFave,
Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, 5 Criminal Procedure § 24.8(c) at 573 (West 2d ed 1999)
(describing the jury instruction regarding the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as "basicf" and "always [ ] included").
4

People v Speight, 606 NE2d 1174,1177 (1111992).
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criminal trial. Judges and witnesses were targets of "clan vengeance"
(p 11) by the defendant's kin; and in at least one time and place, medieval Italy, incorrect judgments rendered the judges "subject to civil
and criminal liability" (p 10). Beyond earthly hazards, there were
"moral and spiritual" (p 11 (emphasis omitted)) consequences to a
guilty verdict. "God, or the fates," (p 11) might seek corrective vengeance. Capital punishments were especially risky, lest the judges and
witnesses commit the sin of murdering the defendant.
To lessen the dangers of rendering judgment, Western European
legal systems developed procedures to provide "moral comfort"
(pp 12-13). Two categories of these procedures are emphasized by
Professor Whitman: responsibility-shifting and agency denial. Responsibility-shifting procedures "comfort the judge by forcing some other
agent to assume all or part of the responsibility" (p 16). An example is
the Anglo-American jury, which, in the words of a nineteenth-century
commentator, "saves judges from the responsibility ... of deciding simp-

ly on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner."'
Agency denial "allow[s] the judge to disclaim meaningful personal
agency even while entering a capital verdict" (p 17). An example here is
a maxim from the twelfth-century Decretum attributed to the canonist
Gratian:' as long as proper procedures are followed, lex eurn occidit,
non tu-"it is the law that kills him, not you" (p 17).
Moral comfort procedures "were a universal and multifaceted
feature of premodern law," in contrast to the modern emphasis on
procedures aiming to provide "factual proof" (p 18). Indeed, "one of
the master themes in the making of modern law" is that "[m]oral comfort has been playing a steadily declining role in procedure over the
past two centuries, while factual proof has grown steadily more important" (p 18 (emphasis omitted)). In earlier times, Professor Whitman
argues, jury trial was more about moral comfort than factual proof.
There were "occasionally factual puzzles that the jurors had to solve"
(p 19), but more often the central question was whether the jurors
would be willing to confirm "what everybody already knew, or strongly
suspected" (p 19).
The distinction is important between factual proof and moral
comfort as procedural objectives. A well-functioning factual proof
procedure "also provides a measure of moral comfort," but "many
good moral comfort procedures do not function at all well as factual
proof procedures" (p 20). The doctrine of reasonable doubt was not a
5 James Fitzjames Stephen, 1 A History of the Criminal Law of England 573 (Macmillan
1883), quoted on pp 16-17.
6
For a groundbreaking analysis of the composition of the Decretum, see generally Anders
Winroth, The Making of Gratian'sDecretum (Cambridge 2000).
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"factual proof procedure by design" (p 25). Rather, it was aimed at the
jury's moral comfort.
Chapter 2 ("The Christian Judge and the Taint of Blood: The Theology of Killing in War and Law") explores the history of the "theology
of judicial bloodshed" (p 31). Judges occupied an uneasy moral position
in Christian Europe. The uneasiness had two sources. First, the scriptures of the New Testament contained texts giving Christians pause
about judging, most prominently the injunction against judging in the
Gospel of Matthew: "[J]udge not, lest ye be judged" (pp 3, 7, 33).
Second, some early Christian theologians viewed any bloodshed as a
pollution requiring purification. Basil the Great (d 379), for example,
"declared that Christians who killed, even as legitimate soldiers, had
to abstain from communion for three years" (p 34). Cyprian of Carthage (d 258) made the same point, but in reverse order: "Those who
had taken communion had to avoid the shedding of blood" (p 34).
The danger of judicial bloodshed became real in the fourth century.
After Constantine's Edict of Milan in 313, Christianity moved from an
outsider faith to a state-approved religion. Christianity subsequently
became the official religion of the Roman Empire in 380 under Theodosius I.7 As a result, "Christians, and especially Christian bishops, began to assume powers of judging and administration" (pp 35-36). Theologians in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, such as Jerome
(d 420) and Augustine (d 430), confronted the problem of whether
inflicting blood punishments polluted the Christian judge (pp 38-40).
They resolved the problem by concluding it was the law, not the judge,
shedding the defendant's blood. In a famous passage, Augustine wrote,
"Cum homo juste occiditur, lex eum occidit, non tu" -"When a man is
killed justly, it is the law that kills him, not you" (p 39). Repeated verbatim centuries later in Gratian's Decretum, this passage became "the
basis of numerous canon texts" (p 47), perhaps most prominently the
Summa of Raymond de Pefiafort (d 1275). As Raymond explained,
the judge does not sin if the criminal is "justly condemned," meaning,
among other things, that the judge must "observe the procedures of
the law"-iuris ordine servato (p 48). The stain of judicial bloodshed
was avoided by correct procedure.
Chapter 3 ("The Decline of the Judicial Ordeal: From God as
Witness to Man as Witness") begins the story of "the birth of jury trial"
(p 52). The critical moment came in 1215, when the Fourth Lateran
Council of the Christian Church (Lateran IV) prohibited clerics from
assisting in the judicial ordeal. The ordeal was a procedure for invok7
See Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey, eds, 13 The Cambridge Ancient History: The
Late Empire,A.D. 337-425 103 (Cambridge 1998).
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ing the judicium Dei-"judgment of God" -to determine the fate of a
person accused of a criminal offense.! The typical ordeals involved
"cold water" or "hot iron" (p 53). The ordeal of cold water required the
accused to be lowered into a body of water or a pit of water constructed
for the purpose. If the accused floated, the water had rejected him,
thereby indicating he was to be punished. If he sank, he was to be acquitted, but first had to be quickly rescued. The ordeal of hot iron required the accused to carry a piece of red-hot iron. The burnt hand
was bound, then examined three days later. If the wound had festered,
the accused was to be punished. If it had begun to heal, he was to be
acquitted. In each case, the ordeal depended on the participation of
the clergy. A priest was present during the procedure and would pray
aloud to God to bless the water or hot iron and to deliver his judgment.'° But in 1215, the Church declared in Canon 18 that no cleric
shall "in judicial tests or ordeals by hot or cold water or hot iron bestow any blessing" (p 49). This canon was designed "to safeguard the
purity of [members of] the clergy" (p 53) by forbidding them to participate in, and become polluted by, judgments of blood.
The decline of the ordeal has been the subject of "two leading
lines of scholarly interpretation" (p 55). One line of interpretation
"supposes that the judicial ordeal was about factual proof' (p 55) and
that the ordeal's decline involved a change "in the nature of factfinding" (p 56) from facts found by God to facts found by man. The
second line maintains that "factual proof was not the issue at all, for
the most part" (p 56) because the facts of innocence or guilt were essentially known prior to an ordeal. Instead, "primarily at stake was the
moral responsibility for judgment" (p 56). Professor Whitman argues
that the first line of interpretation is "deeply misleading," whereas the
second line is "correct" (p 55). The ordeal spared judges the burden of
rendering judgment and spared witnesses "the spiritually perilous business of taking an oath" (p 75). But the ordeal did so at the cost of polluting clerics with the stain of the defendant's blood. After Canon 18
prohibited the participation of the clergy, the "burden of judgment"
fell squarely on "witnesses and judges" (p 90).
Chapter 4 ("Salvation for the Judge, Damnation for the Witnesses:
The Continent") examines the Continental European response to
Canon 18: namely, the development of inquisitorial criminal procedure. Canon 8 of Lateran IV gave official recognition to an ecclesiastical procedure known as the action per inquisitionem-"by inSee notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
9 This paragraph draws on my entry Thomas P. Gallanis, Ordeal: English Common Law, in
Stanley N. Katz, ed, Oxford Encyclopediaof Legal History (Oxford forthcoming 2009).
10 Id.
8

The University of Chicago Law Review

[76:941

quiry" - which determined the guilt or innocence of clerics suspected
of certain crimes against Church law. This procedure was devised by
Pope Innocent III circa 1199 and elaborated in 1206." Expanded in the
course of the thirteenth century into secular criminal law, the action
per inquisitionem enabled judges to act against suspected offenders
without the need for an accuser (p 99). This was advantageous because
accusers were often hesitant to come forward, and understandably so:
"Accusation was hazardous for the accuser, because if he failed to prove
his allegations he became liable to punishment himself" (p 98). The
steps in the inquisitorial criminal proceeding rested within the control
of the judge, from the decision to initiate the action to the investigation
of facts to the determination of innocence or guilt (pp 99, 115). As the
procedure developed, the use of torture was also authorized in certain
circumstances to obtain the defendant's confession. In seeking a replacement for trial by ordeal, many Continental jurisdictions looked to
the action per inquisitionemand the use of torture."
Inquisitorial procedure put the judge in charge, but thereby also
put him in moral danger: "If the ordeal threatened to involve a priest
in bloodshed, the [Continental] trial threatened to do exactly the same
thing to the judge" (p 105). Theologians and jurists responded to the
danger "by scrupulously distinguishing [the judge's] role from the role
of the witness" (p 105). The principle developed by the medieval canon
law was "[i]udex secundum allegata non secundum conscientiam iudi-

cat"-"the judge judges according to the evidence presented, not according to his 'conscience"' (p 105). The word "conscience" here referred "both to the judge's moral convictions and to the judge's knowledge of particular facts" (p 106 (emphasis omitted)). On the latter,
the medieval jurists emphasized that "a judge must never supplement
the record with facts from his own knowledge" (p 108 (quoting "an
early text from the twelfth century")). This prohibition on the use of
private knowledge "was a moral comfort rule, a way for professional
judges to assure themselves that they had maintained a safe distance
from the bloody consequences of the case they were judging" (p 110).
Even without the use of private knowledge, the evaluation of the
evidence still posed a moral danger for the judge. Continental criminal
procedure had developed a "highly rule-bound" (p 115) law of proo,
but the system was not purely mechanical. It still had "considerable discretionary wiggle room" (p 115), hence creating judicial dilemmas. For
example, judges were instructed to find indicia indubitata-"proofs that

did not permit of any doubt" (p 115)-but what did this mean? Drawing
11 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law 147 (Longman 1995).
12 See generally Gallanis, Ordeal (cited in note 9).
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on pronouncements from Popes Clement III (d 1191) and Innocent III
(d 1216) exhorting clergy to avoid the stain of blood by choosing the
"safer path" (p 117), canon lawyers developed the rule "in dubio pro
reo" -"in doubt you must decide for the defendant" (p 122). This rule
"created a form of protection for the accused that grew out of the familiar fear that the judge might make himself into a murderer" (p 123).
Chapter 5 ("Salvation for the Judge, Damnation for the Jury:
England") shifts the discussion from Continental law to the common
law of England. After Canon 18 of Lateran IV prohibited the participation of the clergy in ordeals, the ordeal in England was effectively
dead. Less clear was what would replace it. In 1219, the council of the
young King Henry III (d 1272) issued provisional guidelines, suggesting that some persons accused of serious crimes be placed in prison
awaiting further procedures, while others be permitted to quit the
realm.13 After some experimentation, the king's justices settled on using
men from the vicinity of the offense to speak on oath (hence, these men
were known as juratores-personswho have been sworn) about the
accused person's innocence or guilt. 4 This procedure became known as
trial by jury.
The modern historians of criminal jury trial have "not fully reckoned" with the "moral challenge faced by jurors" (p 150). Unlike the
judge, the jurors had to render a verdict, thereby bearing the "moral
anxieties of judging" (p 151). Moreover, the jurors, until recent times,
were both decisionmakers and witnesses. Early jurors were chosen
from the vicinity of the crime precisely so they could bring information to trial (p 152). Even after the jurors ceased regularly to be selfinforming, their use of some private knowledge was expected "well
into the early nineteenth century ... at least occasionally" (p 151).
The moral pressures on jurors, however, were not as acute in the
Middle Ages as in later centuries, due to three features of the medieval
criminal trial that offered significant protection. First, jurors in medieval
criminal trials were permitted to enter a "special" verdict rather than a
"general" verdict, "making mere findings of fact while forcing the judge
to pronounce the perilous judgment on ultimate liability" (p 154).
Second, criminal trial jurors were immune from the attaint, a procedure at common law to punish civil trial jurors for committing perjury
(p 154). Third, medieval criminal procedure "could avoid inflicting
blood punishments in some instances by allowing the accused the
benefit of clergy" (p 156). This was "a device by which accused persons
were treated as fictive members of the clergy," and thus "neither ex-

13
14

Id.
Id.
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ecuted nor mutilated" (p 156). These three features of the medieval
criminal trial "effectively shielded criminal jurors from much moral
pressure" (p 157). In later centuries, the pressure would intensify.
Chapter 6 ("The Crises of the Seventeenth Century") turns to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Tudor and Stuart monarchies subjected criminal trial jurors to "wholly new pressures" (p 161).
They used "harsh discipline [on] criminal juries that refused to enter the
general verdict" (p 162), including punishment by the Star Chamber,
"the most notorious instrument of Renaissance royal power" (p 162),
and fines and imprisonment imposed by "the judges of the common law
courts" (p 162). In addition, the government "steadily cut back on the
range of offenses for which benefit of clergy was available" (p 162).
These were "moral hard times for English criminal jurors" (p 162).
Relief for the jurors arrived in the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, when the "English government took a critical turn away from
the princely practices of the Continent" (p 162). Two legal developments
in this period are emphasized by Professor Whitman. First, the principle
of juror independence was established in 1670 by the "celebrated decision" in Bushel's Case,5 which held that a juror could not be fined or imprisoned "for a verdict given according to his conscience" (p 176).6

Second, benefit of clergy was "effectively extended in various ways from
the later seventeenth century onward" (pp 162-63), thereby reducing
the frequency of blood punishments. After 1718, indeed, the "ordinary
punishment" was "transport[ation] to the American colonies" (p 163).
Chapter 7 ("The Eighteenth Century: The Rule Emerges") finishes Professor Whitman's historical account 7 by bringing it up to the
late eighteenth century, when the reasonable doubt instruction
emerged "as a formula intended to ease the fears of those jurors who
might otherwise refuse to pronounce the defendant guilty" (p 186).
The "first examples that scholars have found" (p 193) of English cases
using the reasonable doubt formula "come from the [court of the] Old
Bailey [in London] in the mid-1780s" (p 194). In the 1786 trial of Joseph Rickards, for instance, the Old Bailey judge instructed the jury:
"If you are satisfied, Gentlemen, upon the whole, that he is guilty, you
will find him so; if you see any reasonable doubt, you will acquit him"
(p 199)." Analyzing the cases, Professor John Langbein has theorized
84 Eng Rep 1123 (KB 1670).
See id at 1125.
17
After Chapter 7, the book has a brief conclusion addressing the present state and possible future of the doctrine of reasonable doubt and of jury trial.
18
Trial of Joseph Rickards (t17860222-1), The Proceedingsof the Old Bailey (Feb 22, 1786),
online at http://www.oldbaileyonline.orgbrowse.jsp?ref=t17860222-1 (visited Apr 14, 2009). The
jury found Rickards guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death. Id.
15
16
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that the reasonable doubt instruction may be connected to the emergence in the ordinary criminal trial of defense lawyers, who "developed evidentiary and other practices intended to protect the defendant" (p 194).9 But this connection is rejected by Professor Whitman,
who maintains instead that the "underlying concern.., was with protecting the jurors" (p 194). The reasonable doubt formula reassured
jurors that while "[d]oubts were legitimate and had to be obeyed[,]
scruples were foolish and had to be ignored" (p 190).
This line of analysis raises the question of "why the standard established itself in the Old Bailey when it did, in the mid-1780s"
(p 199). Professor Whitman provides a tentative answer by invoking
my own scholarship, which draws attention to the effect of the American Revolution on English criminal justice.n The Revolution stopped
the use of transportation to the American colonies as a punishment,
causing a "real crisis of English justice," at least until 1787 when transportation to Australia was introduced (p 200). The "first cases using
the reasonable doubt formula in the Old Bailey crop up" during the
gap, when it "remained uncertain what was otherwise to be the fate of
those convicted" (p 200). The loss of transportation-a sanction that
was not a blood punishment-as an option had the effect of "rais[ing]
the punishment stakes sufficiently that jurors needed more coaxing to
convict than had been the case in previous decades" (p 200), hence the
appearance of the reasonable doubt instruction.
II. FOUR ACCOLADES
There is much to praise in Professor Whitman's book. In this Part
of the Review, I concentrate on four achievements meriting enthusiastic accolades. Doubtless there are also others. The four are: (1) the
integration of Continental and English legal history, (2) the emphasis
on religion's influence on legal development, (3) the sensitivity to the
moral anxiety of legal decisionmaking, and (4) a thought-provoking
hypothesis. Let me say more about each in turn.

19 For this point, the book cites John H. Langbein, The Origins ofAdversary CriminalTrial
261-66 (Oxford 2003). The best summary of Professor Langbein's view is that "[o]ur sources [ I
leave us unable to say how the emergence of the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard was related
to the growing lawyerization of Old Bailey trials in these years." Id at 265. Rickards did not
appear to have a lawyer and did not call any defense witnesses; it is not surprising that he was
convicted. See Trial of Joseph Rickards (cited in note 18).
20
See T.P. Gallanis, The Mystery of Old Bailey Counsel, 65 Camb L J 159,168-73 (2006).
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A. Continental and English Legal History
The book deserves high praise for integrating English and Continental legal history. Scholars working on the legal history of one side of
the Channel too often fail to look across the water,21 resulting in analyses that are as myopic as they are incomplete. Even within England, legal
historians must be sensitive to the multiple English jurisdictionsregnal, manorial, urban, and ecclesiastical, to name a few-that competed and collided. Good legal history gives us the broader view, and
Professor Whitman's book readily succeeds on this point. The passages
on the emergence of Western European legal institutions (pp 52-54),
in particular, should be required reading at all American law schools.
There is an ongoing debate about the extent of Continental influence on English common law. The pioneering historian EW. Maitland
described the common lawyer as someone who "knew nothing and
cared nothing for any system but his own. 22 The unique features of
English legal development have also been stressed in the scholarship
of Professors R.C. Van Caenegem and S.EC. Milsom.2 Yet there are
other scholars, most notably Professor R.H. Helmholz, who have
rightly emphasized the points of influence or connection between the
law of England and the Roman-canon law of the Continent."
Professor Whitman's book keeps its pan-European perspective
while simultaneously being mindful of differences between the Continent and England. In the aftermath of Lateran IV, "the common law ...
displayed its characteristic emphasis on lay justice and its weak bureaucratic tradition, whereas the civil law had already begun to opt for incipient forms of bureaucratic control of the law" (p 54). These choices
were shaped by national or regional factors; yet the developments are
also part of Europe's common legal past," as Western Christendom
experienced its intellectual and legal renaissance, enabling the "profound institutional transformation" (p 53) of law, state, and society
between 1000 and 1250.

21 For a recent welcome exception, see generally Charles Donahue, Jr, Law, Marriage,and
Society in the Later Middle Ages: Arguments about Marriagein Five Courts (Cambridge 2007).
22
F.W.Maitland, Why the History of English Law is Not Written, in H.A.L. Fisher, ed, 1 The
Collected Papers of FredericWilliam Maitland 480,488 (Cambridge 1911).
23 See R.C. Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law 85 (Cambridge 2d ed
1988); S.FC. Milsom, A Natural History of the Common Law 1-2 (Columbia 2003).
24
See generally R.H. Helmholz, The lus Commune in England: Four Studies (Oxford
2001); R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990 Duke L J 1207.
25
For further treatment of the theme, see generally Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal
Pastof Europe:1000-1800 (Catholic 1995).
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Religion's Influence on Legal Development

A second feature of the book meriting high praise is the perceptive treatment of the influence of religion on legal development. Many
of the distinctive features of the common and civil laws emerged in the
Middle Ages, a period for which the importance of Christianity and the
Christian Church cannot be overstated. The effect of Canon 18 of Lateran IV on criminal procedure is one example of ecclesiastical influence
on medieval secular law, and there are others. Some provisions of the
Magna Carta, for instance, derive from the law of the Church, as Professor Helmholz has persuasively argued." Further, and more broadly, the
use of oaths in a variety of legal proceedings throughout medieval Europe depended upon the gravity of swearing to God. This is one reason why there is a "common heritage" shared by the English and canonical procedures -known respectively as "wager of law" and "compurgation" -that relied on oaths to resolve legal disputes."
Religion's influence on English law extended well beyond the
Middle Ages. The seventeenth century saw the emergence of the maxim that Christianity itself was part of the common law. Sir Matthew
Hale (d 1676), serving as Lord Chief Justice of England, declared in
Taylor's Case that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of England; and
therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion
of the law." 9 The maxim was later repeated in court by other judges,
including Lord Mansfield,' ° and by Sir William Blackstone in his
Commentaries."
The distinction is often made, rightly, between internal and external legal history. Succinctly described by Professor David Ibbetson,
the distinction is this. Internal legal history "deals with law on its own
terms, its sources are predominantly those thrown up by the legal
process-in England, that is, the records of courts, law reports, and
legal treatises-and its practitioners are as often as not trained law-

26
27

Helmholz, 1990 Duke L J at 1210-14 (cited in note 24).
Helmholz, The lus Commune In England at 83 (cited in note 24).

28 86 Eng Rep 189 (KB 1676). See also another report of the case at 84 Eng Rep 906 (KB
1676) (declaring that slander of Christ and the Church is a crime and that religion is "part of the law
it self").
29
86 Eng Rep at 189.
30 See John Lord Campbell, 2 The Lives of the ChiefJustices of England:From the Norman
Conquest till the Death of Lord Mansfield 513 (John Murray 1849) (noting that "the essential
principles of revealed religion are part of the common law").
31
See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *59 (Chicago 1979)
("[C]hristianity is part of the laws of England.").
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yers, or at least scholars whose discipline is law." 2 External legal history, in contrast,
is the history of law as embedded in its context, typically its social
or economic context. It[s] sources are not, or not simply, those
thrown up by the legal process; nor, commonly, is its focus the
law. In so far as it might be said to be the history of law in action,
it is the action that matters.33
Professor Whitman's book combines internal and external approaches. The analysis reflects the author's grounding in the institutions and sources of doctrinal-in this case, procedural -legal

history.

Yet the analysis goes well beyond the traditional sources of law, examining the influence of Christian moral theology on judges, witnesses, jurors, and defendants. "The seas of religion have receded, after
many centuries," Professor Whitman rightly observes, "[b]ut the landscape of the law still includes many of its older diluvian features"
(p 7). The book succeeds in reminding us that the development of law
and legal institutions is shaped, at least in part, by factors external to
the legal system. For the history of law in medieval and early modern
England, we must not forget the role of religion.
C.

The Moral Anxiety of Decision

A third point of success is the book's sensitivity to the moral anxiety of decisionmaking in criminal cases following the decline of the
ordeal. Judges, as "agent[s] of bloody justice, faced a real moral predicament" (p 93). They were "obliged to administer blood punishments"
(p 93), yet with this responsibility judges feared making themselves
into murderers (p 123). Partial solutions emerged in the form of responsibility-shifting-to witnesses (on the Continent) and jurors (in England) -and in protective doctrines connected to the theology of the
"safer path" (p 117), such as the maxim in dubio pro reo-"in doubt
you must find for the defendant" (p 122).
It must be observed that the anxiety of medieval English judges
was not limited to criminal punishment. In civil litigation, the judges of
the central common law courts tried mightily "to avoid making decisions." During pretrial pleading, for example, the judges strongly dis32
David Ibbetson, What is Legal History a History of?, in Andrew Lewis and Michael
Lobban, eds, 6 Law and History: Current Legal Issues 2003 33,34 (Oxford 2004).
33
Id at 33. See also Janet Senderowitz Loengard, Beyond Maitland: The Maturing of a
Discipline,34 J Brit Stud 529, 530 (1995) ("Many scholars are less concerned with the purely
institutional (and certainly with the constitutional) and more interested in the economic and
social components of law.").
34 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 80 (Butterworths 4th ed 2002).
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couraged the use of special pleading or the demurrer, either of which
would have called for judicial pronouncements on questions of law, and
instead sought to channel disputes into the "general issue, leaving [the
questions of law and fact] all to the jury."3 After the verdict, the judges
were similarly reluctant to speak. Post-trial motions were permitted
prior to the late fifteenth century only for "badly joined issues [known
as 'jeofails'] or formal defects in the trial, such as misconduct by jurors."'6 Other grounds would not suffice, and the verdict would stand.
Still, there was likely something distinctive about making decisions that could cause death or the shedding of blood. These punishments were the subject of theological, as well as legal, concern. The
choices to be made required that someone wrestle not only with innocence and guilt but also with sin and responsibility. The English judges
did not want this aspect of the job. They "sought refuge from ... the

agonies of decision" and ensured that "the ultimate responsibility for
a conviction rested on the jurors' consciences."" Professor Whitman
has rightly reminded us that having to make the choice between conviction and acquittal is a moral burden, one that has been borne by
human actors in the legal drama since the decline of the judicium Dei.
D. A Thought-provoking Hypothesis
A fourth feature of the book deserving high praise is the author's
willingness to proffer a thought-provoking hypothesis. Professor
Whitman has an intriguing argument. The reasonable doubt instruction, he maintains, was designed not to protect the accused but rather
to make it easier for jurors to reach a verdict of guilt (p 3). Jurors
needed the reassurance, for they feared divine vengeance if they condemned improperly. In England, the reasonable doubt instruction became established in the 1780s, because by then transportation to the
American colonies was no longer available as a noncapital sanction.
This "raised the punishment stakes sufficiently that jurors needed
more coaxing to convict" (p 200).
Scholarship with a thesis is refreshing. Many of the conference
papers I hear, or manuscripts I review, contain little more than a narrative of past events, with no attempt at an argument or hypothesis.
Perhaps these authors, like reluctant jurors, are taking the safer path.
But it is also the boring path. A thesis that turns out to be wrong -or,

35

Id at 79-80.
83.

36 Id at

37 J.H. Baker, ed, 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman 43,138 (Selden Society 1978). The same
point is made in Sir John Baker, 6 The Oxford History of the Laws of England 47 (Oxford 2003).
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more likely, incomplete, for even Homer nods-is better than no thesis at all.
The legal historian is a detective, seeking to resolve mysteries
from the past. The puzzles are difficult because the unrecorded assumptions of earlier ages are hard to recover. For example, the
twelfth-century treatise known as Glanvill "describes pleas as either
civil or criminal; but [Glanvill's] distinction is not ours."' SAs Professor
Milsom has recently reminded us, "[Llegal history, more than most
kinds of history, depends upon the assumptions with which the materials are read .... And when everybody has forgotten what everybody
once knew ... there is nothing to put the historian on his guard."' The
work of uncovering the history of the law, or the history of the law in
action, takes scholarly effort and imagination. This book is the evident
product of both.

III. FOUR QUESTIONS
The book, like all good scholarship, both answers and raises questions. This Part of the Review focuses on four questions prompted by
Professor Whitman's thesis. The questions are: (1) Was the ordeal's
purpose in England to decide innocence or guilt, to provide moral
comfort in advance of punishment, or both? (2) How did jurors' moral
anxieties evolve from the Catholic Middle Ages to the Anglican late
eighteenth century? (3) What is the connection between the English
reasonable doubt instruction and the Continental law? (4) Why did
the recorded use of the reasonable doubt instruction emerge in England in the 1780s?
A. The Ordeal in England: Proof or Comfort?
The first question is: was the ordeal's purpose in England to decide innocence or guilt, to provide moral comfort in advance of punishment, or both? Professor Whitman argues for the second to the
exclusion of the first. He rejects the "line[] of scholarly interpretation
... that the judicial ordeal was about factual proof' (p 55). For him,
"factual proof was not the issue" (p 56). Rather, "primarily at stake
was the moral responsibility for judgment" (p 56).
Some background on the use of the ordeal, and its alternatives, in
twelfth-century England is in order.'° Ordeals were the most common
38
S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 285 (Butterworths 2d ed
1981). See also G.D.G. Hall, ed and trans, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of
England Commonly Called Glanvill 3 (Oxford 1965).
39
Milsom, NaturalHistory at 76 (cited in note 23).
40
This paragraph draws on my entry Gallanis, Ordeal (cited in note 9).
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form of judicium Dei, the other forms being battle and oaths. Trial by
battle had been introduced into England after the Norman Conquest,
but it was considered appropriate only in some instances of what was
known as "appeal of felony," the private accusation of serious crime."
As explained by Professor Milsom, "If the accuser was himself witness
to the fact, he could in certain kinds of case swear an affirmative oath
which would be tested by battle."42 If an accusation was not brought by
a witness in this way, the alternative was for the accusation to be initiated from "the suspicion of neighbors (the ancestor of the grand
jury)."43 This procedure became known as presentment or, later, indictment." Through the middle of the twelfth century, "an accusation
arising from the suspicion of neighbors ... would put the accused to
answer by swearing an oath of denial, and that oath would be tested in
one of two ways depending on what we should call corroboration."45 If
there was some further proof to support the allegation- "something
like a corpse or a wound to back the accusation up""-then the accused person would be put to the ordeal. But if there was no such
proof, then the oath of denial would itself be tested by oath, in the
procedure known as "wager of law."" The ordeal would also be used,'
in place of wager of law, if "the accused was not of good character." 41
The reforms announced by King Henry II (d 1189) in the Assize of
Clarendon (1166) ended the use of wager of law in presentment cases,
leaving only the ordeal. 9
As the procedure in all criminal matters initiated by presentment,
and in some appeals of felony, the ordeal was used to determine, at
least in part, the fact of the accused's innocence or guilt.' In the ab-

41
42

Id.
Milsom, NaturalHistory at 6 (cited in note 23).

Id.
See Baker, English Legal History at 503,505-06 (cited in note 34).
Milsom, NaturalHistory at 6 (cited in note 23).
46 Id.
47 For a comparison and description of compurgation and wager of law, see id; Helmholz,
The Ius Commune in Englandat 82-134 (cited in note 24).
48 Margaret H. Kerr, Richard D. Forsyth, and Michael J. Plyley, Cold Water and Hot Iron:
Trial by Ordeal in England, 22 J Interdiscipl Hist 573,574 (1992). These scholars suggest that the
ordeal may have been "an instrument of mercy," permitting persons who were probably guilty to
escape death or mutilation. See id at 574,578-80, 588.
49
See Naomi D. Hurnard, The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon, 56 Eng
Hist Rev 374,396-97 (1941). In many but not all instances, the communal accusation would need
to be supported by the presenting jurors in order for the accused to be put to the ordeal. See
Roger D. Groot, The Jury of Presentment before 1215, 26 Am J Legal Hist 1,2,10,15 (1982).
50 See Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenthcentury England,19 L & Hist Rev 1, 12 (2001) ("Battle, however, was only an option if the appellot was a healthy, nonninor male.").
51 See Hurnard, 56 Eng Hist Rev at 397 (cited in note 49).
43
44
45
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sence of a witness ready and able to prosecute, the charge would arise
from neighborhood suspicion. This suspicion, evaluated by the presenting jurors," would result in the accused being put to the ordeal. In
many instances, suspicion was not the same as certainty. An example
can be found in the 1198 assize roll for Norfolk." The roll states that
the presenting jury accused a woman of a homicide. She was put to the
ordeal and cleared. The jury then reported the fama patrie- "rumor of
the country" -that three men committed the killing. Two of the three
died in prison. The third was put to the ordeal.' From this account, the
presenting jury cannot have been certain about the guilt of the woman, otherwise after her acquittal the matter would not have continued
with the presentments of the three men.
Uncertainty about the identity of the criminal would have been
even more prevalent in prosecutions for theft than for homicide. As
Professor Whitman rightly observes, "In cases of theft, it may well be
that God was sometimes the only witness" (p 73). And it must be remembered that theft was a more common crime than homicide.55
The ordeal's use as a procedure of proof does not necessarily
mean that it was always trusted. Henry II, for example, was wary of its
reliability. He decreed in the Assize of Northampton (1176) that a person accused by the community and by the knights of the countryside
of "murder or some other base felony" but acquitted by the ordeal of
water (the most common form of ordeal') would nonetheless be required to abjure the realm. 5
In addition to proof, the ordeal surely also provided moral comfort. Delivering judgment is a weighty responsibility: The abolition of
the ordeal in England transferred the burden from God to men, ultimately the men of the jury. For them, the change cannot have been
welcome. In the words of Professor Milsom,

For examples, see Groot, 26 Am J Legal Hist at 9-10 (cited in note 49).
The following sentences rely on Doris Mary Stenton, ed, 2 Pleas before the King or His
Justices:1198-1202 9 (Selden Society 1952).
52

53

54
55

Id.

For data from the thirteenth century, see C.A.F Meekings, ed, Crown Pleas of the Wiltshire Eyre 1249 58 (Devizes 1961) (noting fifty-three presentments of homicide); id at 63 (noting
forty-seven instances of murder, defined here as "cases in which persons are presented as having
been killed by unknown evildoers"); id at 74 (noting nineteen appeals of homicide, eight appeals
of robbery, and four of burglary); id at 95 (noting, in the privata (private report to the justices),
205 instances of larceny, 35 of homicide, and 3 of burglary). See also Barbara A. Hanawalt, Crime
and Conflict in English Communities: 1300-1348 66 (Harvard 1979) (reporting that of 15,952
indictments between 1300 and 1348, 38.7 percent were for larceny, 24.3 percent were for burglary,
10.5 percent were for robbery, and 18.2 percent were for homicide).
56
See Kerr, Forsyth, and Plyley, 22 J Interdiscipl Hist at 581 (cited in note 48).
57 See David C. Douglas, ed, 2 English HistoricalDocuments:1042-1189 411 (Oxford 1968).
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The ancient comfortable reliance on God to test an oath sworn
by the defendant was at an end, and mortal men, with their own
souls to worry about, would have to swear not just to his credibility but directly to his guilt or innocence. It must have been an upset beyond modern imagination."
The point here is that we need not exaggerate the dichotomy between proof and moral comfort. Both were at work in the ordeal. Professor Whitman is right to observe that a proof procedure "also provides a measure of moral comfort" (p 20). The two are intertwined. We
do not need to deny the one as "deeply misleading" (p 55) to give recognition to the other.
Moral Anxieties from Medieval to Modern?

B.

There is a second question raised by Professor Whitman's book:
how did English jurors' moral anxieties evolve from the Catholic Middle Ages to the Anglican late eighteenth century? The book's first five
chapters concentrate on medieval Europe, both England and the Continent. The sixth and seventh chapters turn to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England. In a book covering so many centuries, not
every development can be fully explored. Yet the period saw two transformations about which more investigation would have been welcome.
One is the decline of the self-informing jury. The other is the changing
theology of blood in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation.
The longstanding conventional wisdom has been that the early
jury, composed of men from the vicinity of the dispute, was substantially self-informing. 9 Verdicts were based primarily on information
obtained by the jurors before the trial, either from their personal
knowledge or by investigation.3 In Professor Langbein's felicitous
phrase, the early jury "came to court more to speak than to listen.""
Some scholars, such as Professor Edward Powell, have questioned this
account, doubting whether the jury was ever truly self-informing.6 2 The
recent work of Professor Daniel Klerman provides strong support for
the conventional wisdom, at least through the thirteenth century.63
Milsom, NaturalHistory at 7 (cited in note 23).
59 This paragraph and the next draw on my entry Thomas P. Gallanis, Evidence: English
Common Law, in Katz, ed, Oxford Encyclopedia of Legal History (cited in note 9).
60 Id at *4.
61 John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance:England,Germany, France 125
(Harvard 1974).
62
See Edward Powell, Jury Trial at Gaol Delivery in the Late Middle Ages: The Midland
Circuit, 1400-1429, in J.S Cockburn and Thomas A. Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True: The
Criminal TrialJury in England,1200-1800 78,115-16 (Princeton 1988).
63 See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-informing?, 77 S Cal L Rev 123,126 (2003).
58
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By the end of the seventeenth century, and probably earlier, jury
trial was transformed. Most of the details are unknown, but the result
is well agreed: the jury had ceased to be self-informing." Verdicts were
based not on juror knowledge or investigation but instead on the
presentation of evidence in court. We can see this principle in the
words of Chief Justice Robert Raymond of the Court of King's Bench
in the case of Constable v Nichols:6 "[I]f a jury man knows anything of
his own knowledge he ought not to acquaint his fellows with
it pri6
vately, but must be sworn in open court, for he is a witness."
The evolution of the juror from an active neighbor-witness into a
passive judge of proof 7 must have affected the nature and degree of
the jury's moral anxiety. Professor Whitman deflects the point by arguing that the jurors' use of their own information continued into and
past the decade crucial to his overall hypothesis, the 1780s. He writes:
"[W]ell into the early nineteenth century, jurors were still expected to
make use of their private knowledge of the case, at least occasionally"
(p 151). Yet he also concedes that such cases "were rare after the central Middle Ages" (p 152). This raises the question: to what extent was
the theoretical possibility of private knowledge a source of moral anxiety? In almost all cases, personal knowledge was not at issue. The
production of evidence rested with the prosecution and defense, with
the juror as a kind of umpire, evaluating whatever proof was provided.
This passive role would not have eliminated moral anxiety, for the
jurors bore the burden of deciding the weighty issue of innocence or
guilt. But in the absence of private knowledge, the anxiety must have
been reduced.
The second development about which I would have encouraged
more discussion is the Protestant Reformation and its effect on the
theology of blood. The book is rightly focused on legal, not religious,
history, but given the central role to the narrative of jurors' moral anxieties about blood punishments (not just capital punishments), the
theology of blood is important.
The book's jump from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century
leaves only a brief opportunity to mention the Protestant Reformation.
The Reformation makes an appearance on page 164,' where Professor
64 See John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror,32 Am J Legal Hist 201,205 (1998).
65
(KB 1726) (MS 1017, folder 83, Harvard Law School Library).
66 James Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special
Juries35 (NYU 2006), quoting Nichols.
67
I draw these terms from the title of John Marshall Mitnick's article, From Neighborwitness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror.See Mitnick, 32 Am J
Legal Hist at 201 (cited in note 64).
68
See the book's index under "Reformation" (p 275).
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Whitman bridges the gap in time by observing that the early seventeenth century saw the publication of books of conscience by the English Calvinists William Ames and William Perkins, and that these books

"differed little in substance from the medieval canon law of conscience"
(p 164). Later seventeenth-century authors on conscience in the same
vein, though writing within the Church of England, included Joseph
Hall (pp 169-71) and Jeremy Taylor (pp 171-72). These writers discussed the role of private conscience in determining an accused's guilt
or innocence, but they did not speak to the theology of blood.
Protestant theology differed from the Catholic on at least some
matters of blood and bloodshed. One illustration comes from the denominations' respective understandings of the Eucharist. The Catholic

doctrine, affirmed in the Council of Trent (1551), has long been transubstantiation: the wine substantively changes into the blood of Christ." The liquid element of the Eucharist is blood. The view of the
Church of England, as stated in the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion

(1563), has been that transubstantiation is "repugnant to the plain
words of Scripture."70 A second illustration points to the denominations' views on absolution from sin, including the sin of shedding
blood. In the Catholic tradition as articulated by the Council of Trent,
absolution comes through the sacrament of penance 7' administered
only by a bishop or priest,' followed by "works of satisfaction. 73 The
doctrine of the Church of England, expressed in the Thirty-Nine Articles, is that penance is not 7a sacrament4 and that "good
works ... cannot put away our sins."
Differences were likely between the medieval Catholic and early
modern Anglican views on the "taint of blood," the topic of the first
chapter and discussed in other chapters concerning the Middle Ages.
7
The subject of the theology of blood, unfortunately, is then dropped,
69 See Rev J.Waterworth, ed and trans, The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent 78 (C. Dolman 1848) ("[Bly the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a
conversion is made ... of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of [Christ's] blood;
which conversion is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation.").
70
Thirty-nine Articles of Religion Art XXVIII (1563), reprinted in The Book of Common
Prayer 402 (Oxford 1815).
71 Waterworth, Canons and Decrees at 93 (cited in note 69) (defining penance as a sacrament).
72
Id at 100 ("[T]he holy Synod declares all these doctrines to be false, and utterly alien
from the truth of the Gospel, which perniciously extend the ministry of the keys to any others
soever besides bishops and priests.").
73 Id at 95 (defining the three parts of penance as "contrition, confession and satisfaction"); id at
104 (describing "works of satisfaction" as the punishment undertaken voluntarily for sins, punishment imposed by a priest, and punishment in the form of "temporal scourges inflicted by God").
74
Thirty-nine Articles Art XXV at 401 (cited in note 70) (defining the two sacraments as
"baptism, and the supper of the Lord").
75 Thirty-nine Articles Art XII at 399 (cited in note 70).
76
See the book's index under "Bloodshed, theology of" (p 272).
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even though the subject of blood seems to be of continuing import.
Jurors' anxieties in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are explicitly linked to the duty to impose "blood punishments" (pp 162,
200). It is true that one book can do only so much. Still, an exploration
of the English theology of blood in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries would have been welcome, given the connection in Professor
Whitman's argument between jurors' moral anxieties about blood
punishments and the reasonable doubt instruction.
C.

Continental Law and England?
A third question is raised by Professor Whitman's book: what is
the connection between the English reasonable doubt instruction and
the Continental law? As noted in Part II.A, there is a longstanding
debate among legal historians about the extent to which the Romancanon law of Continental Europe had an influence on the common
law of England." Professor Whitman, an expert in comparative legal
history, is well positioned to contribute to this debate. Indeed, the history of the doctrine of reasonable doubt provides a valuable case
study. So, to what extent was the English doctrine of reasonable doubt
affected or shaped by the law of the Continent?
The book argues for a "connection" between the reasonable
doubt standard in England and the Continental maxim in dubio pro
reo-"in doubt you must decide for the defendant" (p 122). Yet the
nature of this connection is not made entirely clear. Piecing together
different parts of the book, I think the argument runs as follows. The
in dubio maxim "grew more or less directly out of the safer path doctrine" (p 123). This doctrine held that "when faced with 'doubts,' ...
the judge must choose the 'more benign' and 'milder' path" (p 123). In
England, the safer path doctrine appeared in some seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century theological and legal writings, including Sir Mat8 (published in 1736,
thew Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown"
sixty years after Hale's death in 1676"9): "[W]hen you are in doubt, do
not act, especially in Cases of Life" ' (p 174); and William Paley's Principles of Moral and PoliticalPhilosophy (1785):" "I apprehend much
harm to have been done to the community, by the overstrained scrupulousness, or weak timidity, of juries ... which holds it the part of a
See notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
Sir Matthew Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown (Professional 1971) (P.R. Glazebrook,ed).
79 Baker, English Legal History at 190 (cited in note 34).
80 Hale, 1 Historyof the Pleas at 300 (cited in note 78).
81
William Paley, The Principlesof Moral and Political Philosophy (Mussey & Co Boston
School ed 1852) (John Frost, ed).
77
78
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safe conscience not to condemn any man, whilst there exist the minutest possibility of his innocence" (p 192). The reasonable doubt standard "grew out of" these writings (p 192). Therefore, there is a connection between the in dubio maxim and the reasonable doubt standard
in the sense that they both stem from the moral theology of the safer
path, but there is not a stronger link between them.
Parallel development is entirely plausible. When we observe a similarity between Continental and English law, we must determine
whether it is an instance of influence or, instead, merely of parallel
evolution. There are many examples in each category. As Professor
Helmholz has recently written, "In some cases ... the ius commune did

have demonstrable effects upon the common law. In other situations
...
it is equally obvious that little substantial influence occurred.""

I understand Professor Whitman to be arguing in favor of a
common theological heritage for, but no direct legal connection between, the in dubio maxim and the reasonable doubt standard. Clarification here would be welcome. Yet even if I am correct in this reading,
there is another uncertainty. The book does not connect the dots between the safer path theology of the Middle Ages and its appearance
in English texts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Important to the book's overall narrative, this strand of intellectual history
merits a fuller treatment.
D. Why the 1780s?
The fourth and last question I want to raise is: why did the recorded use of the reasonable doubt instruction emerge in England in the
1780s? Professor Whitman observes that the "first examples that scholars have found" (p 193) of English cases using the reasonable doubt
formula "come from the Old Bailey in the mid-1780s" (p 194). He rejects any significant link between the instruction and the rise of defense
counsel (p 194). Instead, Professor Whitman argues that the "underlying
concern ... was with protecting the jurors" (p 194). The American Rev-

olution stopped the use of transportation as a nonblood punishment,
thereby "rais[ing] the punishment stakes sufficiently that jurors needed
more coaxing to convict than had been the case in previous decades"
(p 200). In short, judges at the Old Bailey began using the reasonable
doubt instruction in the mid-1780s to reassure anxious jurors.
While delighted that Professor Whitman has drawn attention to
the part of my scholarship on the effect of the American Revolution

82 Idat170.
83 Helmholz,

The Ius Commune in England at 6 (cited in note 24).
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on English criminal justice,4 I am not convinced by the argument on
the reasonable doubt instruction. In part, my doubts come from the
nature of the available source, the Old Bailey Sessions Papers (OBSP).
The OBSP are pamphlet accounts of criminal trials, printed and sold
to members of the public. The reports are often compressed, containing the aspects of the trials most of interest to lay readers: "[T]he circumstances of crime, detection, and punishment."' They are "frustrating" for the legal historian interested "in the institutions, procedures,
and personnel of the criminal justice system." This is especially true
for the OBSP of the early and middle 1770s, which were kept thin "in
order to hold down ... the cost of publishing the series."" Beginning in

1778, the stenographic reporter Joseph Gurney "reversed the trend to
compression, increasing the size of [each] session's issue."' Gurney
was followed by Edmund Hodgson, who "reported many cases in exceptional detail."' Hodgson's reportership, from 1782 to 1790, has
been called the "short golden age" of the OBSP.0 Given the changes in
size and detail of the OBSP, it is often hard to tell whether something
first perceived in the mid-1780s is truly new or simply the result of
fuller reporting. For this reason, Professor Langbein has rightly written about the reasonable doubt instruction that "[t]he sources do not
allow us to say whether the novelty in these cases of the mid-1780s is
the articulation of the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, or merely
the disclosure of it (as a result of the greater detail of the Sessions Papers of the period).""1
My doubts also reflect skepticism that the emerging use of the
reasonable doubt instruction was primarily prompted by the unavailability of transportation to the American colonies as a nonblood punishment. After American transportation ended in 1775, England responded initially by ordering hard labor in hulks on the river Thames
and in houses of correction, and later by beginning an ambitious program of prison construction and initiating transportation to Australia.9
These noncapital punishments were likely more severe than the prior
regime of transportation to the established colonies in America, but
the punishments did not involve blood.

84
85

86
87
88
89

See generally Gallanis, 65 Camb L J 159 (cited in note 20).
Langbein, Origins at 186 (cited in note 19).
Id.

Id.

Idat 188.
Langbein, Origins at 188 (cited in note 19).
90 Id.
91 Id at 264.
92 See Gallanis, 65 Camb L J at 170-71 (cited in note 20).
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Lacking better primary sources, I cannot warrant that there is no
connection between the rising harshness of punishment and the use of
the reasonable doubt instruction. But the link between them remains
to be proven.
The solution to the puzzle is likely to be multifaceted. I think it
probable that the answer is connected in some way to the primary
development in the felony trial during this period: its transformation
into an adversarial contest increasingly dominated by lawyers.9 The
criminal trial for felony (serious crime) was sharply different from the
summary proceedings for misdemeanor, where, as Professor Bruce''
Smith has demonstrated, there was instead a "presumption of guilt." 4
In the trial for serious crime, the late eighteenth century saw the
emergence of "a series of procedural and evidentiary protections benefiting defendants tried at the Old Bailey, including the right to
counsel, the notion of the prosecution's 'case,' and the 'beyondreasonable-doubt' standard of proof."" The precise connection among
these is still unknown. Professor Whitman's book commendably reminds us that there is an aspect of the reasonable doubt standard that
protects the juror, providing a safe harbor for conviction. Jurors
should feel free to convict if their doubts are so excessively scrupulous
as to be unreasonable. Yet there is also an aspect of the standard that
protects the accused.
All we can safely say, given the state of the evidence, is that something changed in the 1780s-or earlier, but was recorded in the
1780s- to prompt the use of the reasonable doubt instruction. Frustratingly, we do not know more. On this aspect of the trial's history, the
jury is still out.
CONCLUSION

F W. Maitland described the Norman Conquest as a "catastrophe
which determines the whole future history of English law."' For European criminal procedure, the same can be said of the Christian Church's
decision in 1215 to prohibit clerical participation in the ordeal. Lacking clerical blessing, the ordeal fell into disuse. The end came more
quickly in England than on the Continent but was profoundly felt on
93 See generally J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal
Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,9 L & Hist Rev 221 (1991).
94 Bruce P. Smith, The Presumptionof Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850,23 L
& Hist Rev 133,135 (2005).
95 Id at 134-35. See also May, Bar and Old Bailey at 235 (cited in note 1) (referring to the
"development of the concept of the presumption of innocence in the eighteenth century").
96 Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 1 The History of English Law
before the Time of Edward 179 (Cambridge 2d ed 1898, reprinted 1968).
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both sides of the Channel. Indeed, it is fair to say that the disappearance of the ordeal affected European legal history more significantly
than its use. The important distinction between the Anglo-American
trial by jury and the Continental inquisitorial system can be traced to
the search across Europe for alternative criminal procedures.
Professor Whitman's book makes an important contribution to
our understanding of the history of Western European criminal procedure and Anglo-American jury trial. The argument challenges the
conventional wisdom and prompts fresh thinking about seemingly
well-understood legal institutions and doctrines. The thesis is not bulletproof and leaves some questions insufficiently answered. But the
questions do not undermine the significance of the accomplishment.
This is a groundbreaking book that deserves a broad readership.

